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HOPWOOD v. TEXAS
78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
I. FACTS
Cheryl J. Hopwood, Douglas W. Carvell, Ken-
neth R. Elliott, and David A. Rogers applied for ad-
mission to the 1992 entering class of the University
of Texas School of Law, ("university").' All four were
white residents of Texas and were denied admission.2
They filed suit against the university under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The
allegations stemmed from plaintiffs' contention that
the university's admissions program discriminated
against them by giving substantial preference to less
qualified African and Mexican -American applicants.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory re-
lief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
The university's admissions decisions were based
largely upon each applicant's Texas Index number
("TI") which was a function of the applicant's un-
dergraduate grade point average and Law School
Aptitude Test Score.4 For administrative conve-
nience, the university placed applicants in one of
three categories according to their TI scores: "pre-
sumptive admit," "presumptive deny," or a middle
"discretionary zone."5 The plaintiffs fell into the dis-
cretionary zone. The TI ranges used to categorize
IHopwoodv. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
2See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F Supp. 551, 567 (W.D.
Tex. 1994.) The defendant contested the ripeness of
Hopwood and Elliot's claims because neither had been
denied admission. The district court found in pretrial
motions and hearings that each had been denied admis-
sion. The defendant further challenged the standing of all
plaintiff; because none demonstrated that they would have
been granted admission absent the challenged admissions
policies. During the same pretrial hearing, the court de-
termined that all the plaintiffs had standing because they
proved that the university's admissions process was the
cause of their injury and that a judicial order could re-
dress the injury.
3Title VI proscribes discrimination that violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The prohibitions against discriminatory conduct contained
in Title VI govern "program[s] or activit[ies] receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §2000(d) (1964).
resident African and Mexican-Americans for place-
ment into the three admissions categories were lower
than for whites. 6 In addition, a special three-mem-
ber subcommittee reviewed black and Mexican -
American candidates within the applicable "discre-
tionary zone" separately from whites and non-pre-
ferred minorities.
7
Although the district court found that aspects
of the university's affirmative action admissions pro-
gram passed constitutional muster, it held that the
program's failure to compare each individual appli-
cant with the entire pool of applicants violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." On this basis alone, the district court struck
down the 1992 admissions policy as administered
by the university, finding that it fell outside of the
narrowly tailored framework established by the
Court.9 The district court however, refused to en-
join the university from using race in admissions
decisions or to grant damages beyond the nominal
award of one-dollar. 0 The court granted declaratory
relief and ordered that the plaintiffs be allowed to
reapply without paying the administrative fees.I
Examining the admissions program through a lens
of strict scrutiny, required for racial classifications,
the district court held that the residual effects of
past discrimination in a particular component of
The University, as a recipient ofTitle VI funds, is required
to comply with Title VI.
4 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
Sd.
6 Id. at 936. In March 1992, the presumptive TI ad-
mission score for resident whites and non-preferred mi-
norities was 199. Mexican Americans and blacks needed
a TI of 189 to be presumptively admitted.
7 Id. at 937.
8Hopwood, 861 F Supp. at 579.
9See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987). (Establishing whether race-conscious remedies are
appropriate. The Court looked at several factors includ-
ing the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alterna-
tive remedies; the flexibility and duration of relief; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant market
and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties).
1o The issue of damages is outside the scope of the
casenote. For a resolution of this issue, See Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 955-957.
SHopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
Texas' educational system must be analyzed in the
context of the state's educational system as a whole.'
2
On this basis, the trial court expanded the analysis
from reviewing the history of discrimination within
the context of the law school alone to the context
of the totality of the educational system. In doing
so, the court determined that the broad-based rem-
edy employed by the law school satisfied the com-
pelling governmental interest of remedying the
present effects of past discrimination necessary to
justify the university's affirmative action program.
The district court also noted that the legacy of past
dejure discrimination within the university fostered
a campus environment hostile towards minorities.13
The district court concluded that in the context of
the university's admissions process, the benefits of a
racially and ethnically diverse student body sup-
ported the use of racial classifications. 4 The court's
reliance on the testimony of law school deans, stu-
dents and professors supported its position that the
legacy of past discrimination was manifest in the
university's present malevolent reputation in the
minority community, particularly among prospec-
tive students, as a "white school" with an under-rep-
resentation of minorities. The trial court, therefore,
concluded that absent the affirmative action pro-
gram, the university would be unable to achieve its
compelling goal of diversity.' s
II. HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs. 16 The Fifth Circuit held
that the university's efforts to remedy the present
effects of past de jure discrimination must be con-
fined to correcting its own history of discrimination
rather than discrimination by Texas or society in
general. Specifically, the court refused to recognize
the perceived effects of a hostile environment to-
wards minorities and the university's poor reputa-
tion in the minority community as a compelling
12 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
(Ordering University of Texas to admit Sweatt, an Afri-
can-American to the previously all-white law school based
on the Texas educational system's discrimination against
African-Americans).
13Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
14 Id. at 571.
Is/d,
W6Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 961.
17 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
governmental interest. Departing from Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 17 the court also held
that achieving diversity in the university was not a
compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit held that the university's admission
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court further in-
structed the district court to revisit the issue of which
party bears the burden of proof regarding damages
for a proven constitutional violation.' The United
States Supreme Court declined to review this case.'9
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A. REMEDIAL PURPOSE
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit employed the
heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny outlined in Rich-
mond v. JA. Croson Co. 20 to its evaluation of the
racial classifications implemented by the university.
Only when a strong basis 6xists for believing the
state actor has discriminated in the past will a court
conclude that a state entity's remedial action is nec-
essary.2' To pass constitutional muster, the state's use
of remedial racial classifications must be limited to
the harm caused by a specific state actor.
22
The Fifth Circuit applied the teachings of Croson
and its progeny, and it appropriately held that the
district court erred in allowing the university's re-
medial justification to lie in the racial discrimina-
tion of all public education within the State of
Texas. 3 The circuit court did not impugn the prin-
ciple of applying remedial action to all discrimina-
tion cases. Instead, it limited the application of rem-
edying past discrimination to specific state actors.
The circuit court commented that, "when one state
actor begins to justify racial preferences based upon
the actions of other state agencies, the remedial
actor's competence to determine the existence and
scope of the harm... and the appropriate reach of
the remedy is called into question."24 The circuit
court found that addressing the actions of other state
'"The appropriate standard elucidated by the Fifth
Circuit employed a burden shifting exercise whereby once
a Constitutional violation has been established by the
plaintiffs, the university must demonstrate by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it would have rejected the
plaintiffs to the university.
'9 Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
ZORichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
zHopwood, 78 F.3d at 949.
23Id. at 950.
Z4 Id. at 951.
bodies would call for "boundless remedies" which
would expand beyond constitutional limits.2s
Upon reviewing the university's admissions
policy, the Fifth Circuit determined the dispositive
factors of the district court's rulings and concluded
that the university retained no present effects of past
discrimination. Despite the district court's clear de-
termination that the university's documented his-
tory of discrimination, as well as its poor reputation
in minority communities and the perception of a
hostile environment, warranted a race-based admis-
sions program, the Fifth Circuit found otherwise.2 6
Instead of remanding the issue to the district court
outlining the appropriate standard to determine a
factual finding, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court.2 7 Relying on Podberesky28 the cir-
cuit court held that the university's poor reputation
was "tied solely to knowledge of the [u]niversity's
discrimination before it admittedAfrican-American
students."- It further held that "[m]ere knowledge
of historical fact is not the kind of present effect
that can justify a race-exclusive remedy.'0 0The court
further opined that, although the school once em-
braced institutionalized de jure discrimination in
denying admission to blacks, this practice ended in
1950 when the United States Supreme Court struck
down the law school's discriminatory admissions
program.3 ' According to the Fifth Circuit, any fur-
ther discrimination ended in the 1960's.31 Based on
this reasoning, the court came to the questionable
conclusion that any present racial tension at the uni-
versity was predicated on current societal discrimi-
nation unrelated to the university's past institution-
alized discrimination.33
The Fifth Circuit also justified its finding that
the university was not hostile to minority students




1 A finding is dearly erroneous when, based on the
entire evidence the reviewing court concludes with firm
conviction that the lower court's decision is completely
devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational
relationship to the supporting data. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a); United States v. US. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
394-395 (1948); Haines v. Liggett Group, Ina, 975 F.2d
81, 82 (3d Cir. 1992).
28Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 E3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert denied, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
29Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952.
301d. at 952.3'Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
32 Hopwood, 78 F3d at 953.
378 F.3d at 953.
tinued to apply for admission despite the university's
poor reputation.34 Using this reasoning, the court
found that minority students who applied to uni-
versities with reputations of discrimination substan-
tiated the notion that the institution did not dis-
criminate. Effectively, the Fifth Circuit's holding
leaves room for a remedial measure only when mi-
nority applicants fail to apply for admission.
B. DIVERSITY
The Supreme Court held in Bakke that diver-
sity is a compelling state interest .3 Despite the hold-
ing in Bakke, the Fifth Circuit held that any consid-
eration of race or ethnicity by a university for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body was not
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In
support of its departure from Bakke, the Fifth Cir-
cuit relied on recent Supreme Court decisions that
recognize a compelling interest in affirmative action
programs when the programs seek to remedy the
past effects of racial discrimination.3 7 However, none
of the decisions relied upon by the Fifth Circuit re-
lated to diversity specifically in the educational con-
text.38 For example, in Croson, the Court struck
down a city race-based affirmative action policy
which required contracts to be awarded to minority
business enterprises.39 The Adarand Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting and held that federal minority
set-aside radio programs must satisfy strict scrutiny.
40
None of these cases suggests that Bakke should be
overruled, because neither of these cases examines
the unique role of higher education, the circuit
court's heavy reliance on them is questionable.
The United States Supreme Court has held that
the educational considerations at issue in Bakke are
subject only to a narrow avenue of judicial review.
41
4 Id.
35Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
36 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.3 11d. at 943.
38 Id.
39 Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
4 Adarand Construction v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995), (Overruling in part Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
41 University Of Michigan v. Ewing, 474, U.S. 214, 227
(1985). (Holding that courts are not suited to evaluate
the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that
require an expert evaluation.) See also Note, An Evidentiary
Framework For Diversiy As A Compelling Interest In Higher
Education, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1364 (1996). (Ex-
plaining the evidentiary framework for diversity as a com-
pelling interest in higher education).
One of the areas the Court has sought to protect is
the autonomous decisionmaking of academic insti-
tutions. 42 Freedom of decisionmaking by institutions
protects both the individual academic freedom of
teachers and students encompassed by the First
Amendment as well as the institutional academic
freedom meant to be protected by the Court in Re-
gents of Michigan v. Ewing.43 And in Bakke, Justice
Powell discussed the four essential freedoms of a
university-"the academic freedom to decide who
may teach, what may be taught, how it is taught
and who may be admitted to study."" A university
admissions decision is an example of such an aca-
demic decision.45 Interference in institutional aca-
demic freedom could impair individuals' freedom
to inquire, to study, and to evaluate protected intel-
lectual pursuits essential to the quality of higher
education.
4 6
In addition to protecting academic decision mak-
ing, Justice Powell in Bakke supported the consider-
ation of ethnicity as "one element" in a range of fac-
tors that universities may consider in achieving the
legitimate academic goal of heterogeneous student
body.47 Describing race or ethnic background as a
"plus" in an applicant's file, the Justice wrote that
individuals who receive admission as a result of their
combined qualifications, including "plus" factors,
would not unconstitutionally displace applicants
who were rejected because they were not the right
color or background.48 The "plus" applicants, how-
ever, could not insulate themselves from compari-
son with all other applicants. Thus, a program which
considered race or ethnicity among a host of factors
as a "plus" which might "tip the scales" in the admis-
sions decision would be constitutional.
4 9
The district court in Hopwood addressed the First
Amendment concerns of the Court by deferring to
the University's decisionmaking after it heard the
testimony of deans from law schools across the coun-
try, as well as the University of Texas faculty. Based
on the evidence presented, the court concluded that,
although the university had made genuine efforts
to end discrimination, the legacy of the past had
42Universiy ofMichigan, 474 U.S. at 226 n. 12 (1985).
43 1d.
44Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. (quoting Sweezy v. New




4778 F.3d at 943.
481d.
491d. at 943-944.
nonetheless left residual effects that persisted in the
present. s° The district court found that without af-
firmative action, the university could not achieve
its goal of diversity. In fact, the minority representa-
tion at the university would have been woefully in-
adequate had the law school based its 1992 admis-
sions solely on TI's without regard to race and
ethnicity.s The court acknowledged that, without
an affirmative action admissions policy, the 1992
entering class would have consisted of, at most, nine
African and eighteen Mexican -Americans. 2
The Fifth Circuit, however, adopted a different
approach. Relegating the First Amendment issue to
a footnote, the circuit court noted that the univer-
sity did not have a First Amendment interest in the
context of diversity.53 The court then criticized Jus-
tice Powell's concept of the "plus" program and its
application under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
"plus" program was designed to allow universities
to consider ethnicity as a contributing factor towards
their goal of diversity in admissions. The Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that achieving a diverse student
body was not a compelling state interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because Justice Powell's
argument in Bakke received only his own vote, the
Fifth Circuit held that it was not bound by Powell's
conclusion. 4 Citing Croson and Metro Broadcasting,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court
foreclosed a finding of diversity as a compelling state
interest when it stated that "there is essentially only
one compelling state interest to justify racial classi-
fications: remedying past wrongs."5
In striking down the university's admissions pro-
cess in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
use of race in admissions for diversity in higher edu-
cation contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection.55 The
court asserted that diversity treats minorities as a
group, rather than individuals. While the court rec-
ognized that such treatment may further remedial
purposes, the court's holding rested on the notion
that it might just as likely promote improper racial
stereotypes and thus fuel racial hostility.
5 7
54Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571.
51 d.
52 d.
53 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943 n. 25.
78 F.3d at 943 n. 25.






Based on the Fifth Circuit's review of Hopwood,
a narrow application of remedial purpose limited to
the past discrimination of the remedying entity, is
the only compelling state interest sufficient to sat-
isfy strict scrutiny. Despite Bakke, a university's goal
of a diverse student body cannot support an admis-
sions policy which considers race and ethnicity. The
Court's refusal to review Hopwood further strength-
ens the Fifth Circuit's position against using racial
classifications and racial preferences in admissions
programs. Thus, it appears that the Court is allow-
ing the dismantling of affirmative action programs
in higher education which have taken many years
to build.
After Hopwood, affirmative action in admissions
programs for institutions of higher learning may
become defunct. The Fifth Circuit, however, left
open the possibility for affirmative action admissions
programs to be constitutional. Universities which
adopt remedial programs must make a showing that
they have a strong basis of evidence establishing dis-
crimination and that discrimination is particularized
to the institution.58 Any programs based on findings
of past discrimination must be limited in scope and
duration in order to ensure that the relief adopted
in fact redresses the precise injury complained of,
rather than societal discrimination.s9 Therefore, a
university must exclude from its affirmative action
program applicants whose race is adequately repre-
sented, or those who have not suffered from past
discrimination. 60
Affirmative action programs with the goal of
diversity may be designed to encompass First
Amendment values in education. The functions of
a university are varied. Among them are the basic
goals of learning, including the freedom to inquire,
to study, to evaluate, and to gain new maturity and
understanding.6 Central to these roles is the goal of




academic freedom on both the individual and insti-
tutional levels. A university's assessment that a di-
verse student population is essential to these free-
doms and contributes to the fulfillment of the
institution's mission should, thus, receive favorable
judicial treatment.61 With-evidence that diversity
furthers an educational environment, courts should
continue to follow Bakke and diversity in higher
education as a compelling First Amendment inter-
est.6
Although states will continue to amend their
affirmative action admissions programs for state in-
stitutions as a result of the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood
interpretation of the constitutional guidelines set
forth in Bakke, states will still have viable constitu-
tional arguments for their programs. In deciding
Bakke, Justice Powell acknowledged the First
Amendment issues in reviewing admissions pro-
grams by noting that universities must have wide
discretion as to who should be admitted. The Court
will not second guess legitimate "academic" deci-
sion-making.r4 Since Bakke, the Court has empha-
sized that academic decisions are subject only to a
narrow avenue of judicial review because those de-
cisions are not readily adapted to procedural tools
of judicial or administrative decision making.65 Many
complex academic decisions, according to the Court,
require expert evaluation of cumulative information
about which the Court is ill-informed.66 By ignor-
ing the First Amendment implications of its deci-
sion in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit left the door open
for future challenges to its holding. Challenges that
recognize Justice Powell's concerns, and advocate
that admissions programs are legitimate and highly
subjective academic entities, may succeed in retain-
ing well-structured affirmative action programs.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
John A. Henry, Jr.
62Id. at 1365.
3Id. at 1374.
6Id. at 1365.
65Id.
6Id.

